

EXHIBIT E



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

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10/12/2018 10:27 EDT

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CASE NUMBER

CASE OPENED

12/17/2014

CURRENT CASE TITLE

REPORT TITLE

CHS Debrief regarding TEYF

SYNOPSIS

HSI RAC Raleigh, FBI Raleigh, and IRS Wilmington Agents initiated an investigation into Leonid TEYF and other Russians in the Raleigh, North Carolina. TEYF and others engaged in Visa Fraud to enter the US and to adjust as Lawful Permanent Residents. Once in the US, TEYF engaged in money laundering activities to launder illicit proceeds from overseas in violation of 18 USC 1956, Money Laundering. Leonid TEYF and others are under investigation for violations of 18 USC 1546, Visa Fraud, and 18 USC 1342, Wire Fraud within the Eastern District of North Carolina.

This report of investigation is a verbatim debrief of an FBI Source from September 2017.

REPORTED BY

Tony Bell

SPECIAL AGENT

APPROVED BY

Brian Padian

SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT

DATE APPROVED

4/23/2018

Current Case Title

ROI Number

Date Approved

4/23/2018

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DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION

HSI RAC Raleigh, FBI Raleigh, and IRS Wilmington Agents initiated an investigation into Leonid TEYF and other Russians in the Raleigh, North Carolina. TEYF and others engaged in Visa Fraud to enter the US and to adjust as Lawful Permanent Residents. Once in the US, TEYF engaged in money laundering activities to launder illicit proceeds from overseas in violation of 18 USC 1956, Money Laundering. Leonid TEYF and others are under investigation for violations of 18 USC 1546, Visa Fraud, and 18 USC 1342, Wire Fraud within the Eastern District of North Carolina.

CONFIDENTIAL HUMAN SOURCE REPORTING

CHS was employed by Leonid TEYF as a security guard while in Russia. CHS started out as a security guard and eventually worked up to management. CHS was a former police officer in Russia. TEYF owned several businesses in Russia to include the Delta Plus fish company. At some point, TEYF held the position of Assistant Director of Trade (a position that sells goods to Russian military personnel). Sometime during the time SERDYOKOV was Minister of Defense a large part of the logistical support for the Russian military became privatized to save money. TEYF, through his various companies became this private supplier of logistics.

CHS overheard conversations between TEYF and personnel operating TEYF's subcontractors concerning percentages of money to be paid back to TEYF. Each facet of the logistical operation provided a different percentage of "kickbacks" to TEYF, food services might be a certain percentage while uniforms might be another percentage. Percentages depended on how much could be cut but yet still provide the contracted services without an obvious decrease in quality or quantity.

The major portion of the percentage was paid to SERDYOKOV with TEYF receiving the next largest and the remainder being shared between other involved parties. The records of these transactions were kept on paper by TEYF as he was computer illiterate according to CHS. TEYF's accountant Yelena ZELENKOVA kept computer records of all transactions and accounts.

TEYF formed the RBE Group. RBE was the go between to the subcontractors and the company TEYF set up to receive the government contracts. TEYF selected Andrei SHOKIN to head RBE. CHS was present during the hiring process of SHOKIN. CHS advised TEYF he should not trust SHOKIN due to information CHS turned up during public internet searches. After SHOKIN was hired, CHS was present during conversations between TEYF and SHOKIN. These conversations focused on TEYF giving instructions to SHOKIN on how to do kickbacks and handle money transfers. CHS recalled multiple meetings where these aforementioned topics were discussed.

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TEYF hired an individual named Mikhailovsky or Mikhailov who ran a resort in Astrakahan on the Black Sea. TEYF had a company in the Astrakahan area. Mikhailov's role was to keep an eye on SHOKIN. SHOKIN and Mikhailov eventually plotted together and deceived TEYF. SHOKIN and Mikhailov stole \$30 million US dollars from RBE and TEYF then went to England where CHS believes he still is. The \$30 million belonged partly to TEYF and partly to Minister SERDYOKOV. TEYF became so upset with SHOKIN that it nearly started a war between the two. During a meeting between the CHS and TEYF in North Carolina last fall, TEYF told the CHS he recently had a conversation with SERDYOKOV. SERDYOKOV asked TEYF about the \$30 million dollars. TEYF told SERDYOKOV he did not have it, SHOKIN took it. SERDYOKOV told TEYF that SERDYOKOV would solve this problem.

CHS role was security. CHS was instructed by TEYF to meet money couriers at different locations. CHS was not told how much money was to be picked up. CHS would be provided a telephone number and a location. The locations initially were airports but CHS expressed security concerns so the locations changed to highways and other places. CHS would pick up the money, which was in either bags or boxes and take it to different accountants. All of the accountants worked under the direction of TEYF's primary accountant ZELENOVA. CHS would open money containers to ensure it was there but the sums were very large so the accountants would count it. CHS saw various currencies to include Russian rubles in the packages. TEYF would call the CHS after the money pickup and tell CHS while CHS was mobile which accountant to go to. ZELENOVA coordinated the accountant's activity but the various accountants did not directly work for TEYF. CHS last spoke to ZELENOVA in 2015. CHS described ZELENOVA as a white female Russian in her late 30's. TEYF told CHS that ZELENOVA is currently working at a company in Moscow that is part of SERDYOKOV's holdings.

CHS advised that the conversation last fall CHS had with TEYF concerning SHOKIN and SERDYOKOV's comment came up because TEYF offered CHS another position. TEYF wanted CHS to go back to Russia and become a security person again for TEYF. CHS believes that TEYF told CHS about SERDYOKOV's comment to let CHS know matter of \$30 million was settled or soon to be. In addition to protecting money shipments and doing backgrounds on various employees/potential employees, CHS would protect TEYF from attacks and negotiate with various criminal groups in Russia on TEYF's behalf. CHS gave examples of some of these criminal organizations as the Podolsk Group (Moscow), Rostov Group, Chechen Group and the Dagestan Group. TEYF had CHS take approximately \$250,000 to the Dagestan Group on one particular occasion.

According to CHS, the current situation in Russia is one which government officials are part of crime groups or are in partnership with them. PUTIN controls the Chechen group who does tasks for PUTIN. A former GRU Chief is in a leadership role with the Podolsk Group. CHS stated that

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an individual named KADIN was in a leadership role in the Volgograd Group and at the same time was head of the Russian government's boxing ministry. CHS advised that KADIN had been killed. CHS cited this as an example of criminal groups entwined with government.

CHS made three deliveries of very large amounts of cash to SERDYOKOV through SERDYOKOV's son in law PUZIKOV. TEYF would instruct CHS to go to RBE Group offices. TEYF would provide CHS with an entry card and safe codes. These offices were located in Moscow possibly on Shashoski Val. RBE Group had two large safes and one small one in their offices. CHS and a second security person, Dmitri SHCHIAVI (CHS believes him to still be in Russia), would pick up the money. Each time the money was packaged in bundles. CHS placed the money in large bags. CHS would be in a vehicle with the money and have two additional cars along for security. CHS would meet PUZIKOV on a road and transfer the money. The first shipment was \$70 million US dollars, the second \$30 million and the last \$50 million. CHS believes all three shipments were probably in the 2013 timeframe.

In 2014, CHS heard TEYF, SHOKIN and Mikhailovsky discussing new scheme involving cashless transactions. TEYF told CHS about a money laundering company that was run by Dmitri LNU, known to CHS as Dmitri Tahoe as he drove a Tahoe SUV. The company was FK, possibly Finance Consulting. FK was in the used/spare auto parts business. TEYF discussed with CHS that there was a 5% or 6% fee for laundering the money with FK. CHS gained some knowledge of TEYF's dealings through emails. TEYF was computer illiterate and CHS would often handle TEYF's emails.

Sometime in 2013, CHS made an anonymous whistleblower complaint to the prosecutor's office concerning TEYF and SERDYOKOV. The scandal went public. Afterwards, TEYF asked CHS who theoretically would have access to the information to make the complaint. CHS was approached by individuals identified as Russian Counterintelligence who took CHS's computer which CHS never got back. CHS still has some TEYF emails in CHS's possession.

CHS is in possession of a recording of an individual who was very close to chief prosecutor Fredinsky.

The individual recorded was PEREDRIY (believed by CHS to be a security official for Gazprom or one of its holdings). PEREDRIY was given \$400,000 dollars to stop the investigation ("solution of a problem") into TEYF. CHS was the middleman in the transaction. After the investigation stopped, TEYF sent CHS back to PEREDRIY to get the money back as TEYF was greedy. TEYF instructed CHS to record the conversation. PEREDRIY did not want to give the money back. PEREDRIY made threats. After the meeting CHS gave the recording to TEYF but CHS kept a copy as well.

CHS identified a photo of John COTTER. CHS met COTTER on one occasion at CTK Trucking in Chicago, spring 2017. CHS was at CTK visiting a friend Oarst VETRUK. CHS heard a lot about

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COTTER from VETTRUK. VETTRUK told CHS that TEYF has COTTER managing CTK. COTTER is also involved in real estate and a medical company. CHS is unsure of the relationship between COTTER and TEYF. CHS believes that COTTER may live in North Carolina and flies to Chicago to solve issues at CTK.

CHS identified a photograph of POLYAKOV. CHS first met POLYAKOV in Russia around 2014 when POLYAKOV came to visit TEYF. TEYF and POLYAKOV appeared to be friends. CHS recalled POLYAKOV visiting TEYF one additional time. CHS knows POLYAKOV and TEYF are engaged in business together both in Russia and the US. TEYF and POLYAKOV are involved with a Gazprom project called Northstream. CHS believes Northstream to be a natural gas pipeline involving Russia and possibly China. TEYF and POLYAKOV's involvement is concerning welding equipment. In approximately 2015, POLYAKOV visited Chicago. POLYAKOV and TEYF visited CTK. CHS has spoken to POLYAKOV on the telephone. POLYAKOV was trying to reach TEYF who was unavailable traveling. CHS was in Russia when that call took place. CHS would only speak to POLYAKOV at the request of TEYF.

CHS knows the accountant for CTK Alexei TIMOFEEV. The following telephone numbers were provided for TIMOFEEV: 919-233-3993, 413-250-2285 and +7-916-335-35-40. CHS was asked by TEYF to go to CTK and determine who was stealing money since CTK was suffering losses. CHS determined that dispatchers were stealing, but not a lot. Two dispatchers in particular were identified by CHS, Mikhail LNU and Andreii LNU. TIMOFEEV was on the phone with TEYF every night getting directions. TEYF gave instructions on who to pay and how much down to the last cent. As a result CTK is losing a lot of money to this day. CHS believes that CTK only exists to launder money for TEYF. When CHS was tasked to find out who was stealing CHS wanted to look at the financial records but was blocked by TIMOFEEV. CHS made an attempt to login on to CTK computers but was found out by TIMOFEEV. CHS learned that TIMOFEEV put a tracker or keystroke logger on the computer. TIMOFEEV locked everyone out of the financial computer except for TIMOFEEV and his wife. COTTER is in charge of CTK now. CHS doesn't think COTTER controls the finances. TIMOFEEV and his wife do. They have desktop and laptop computers that contain the records. CHS knows TIMOFEEV's wife to be close friends with TEYF's wife.

The last time the CHS met with TEYF, TEYF offered to pay off CHS's debts as well as buy CHS a new car. According to CHS, TEYF still owes CHS approximately \$12,000. TEYF called any money given to CHS "financial assistance". When CHS was paid by TEYF the money did not come directly to him.

TEYF would send money to a bank in Russia. The money would be sent by MoneyGram to CHS in the US. When CHS Complained to TEYF about the difficulties of this pay system TEYF fired CHS. CHS described one part of the protection he provided for TEYF in Russia as being a go between or negotiator. Roskat, TEYF's caviar company in Russia was the target of a hostile takeover attempt by an executive director TEYF had appointed. TEYF directed CHS to serve a letter to the

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executive firing her. CHS was also instructed to obtain the "founding documents" for the company. CHS was unsuccessful. The executive called family members who were gang members. The gang members contacted TEYF. TEYF told the gang members that it was CHS's idea to secure the "founding documents". The gang was the Volgograd-Astrakhan gang. They approached CHS and asked why CHS protects TEYF. As a result of the incident with the gang, CHS had to leave Astrakhan. CHS was told several names of company holders linked to TEYF that were located in Tortola. CHS did not recognize any of the names. TEYF owns a share of FedEx transportation in Utah. CHS has never been to Utah. TEYF does not have a managing interest, just financial. CHS overheard conversations between TIMOFEEV and Utah while CHS was at CTK. TIMOFEEV seemed to always be solving issues for Utah. TIMOFEEV told CHS that TEYF invested in the Utah Company and was receiving profits from that investment. CHS believes one person in Utah may be Yevgeny LNU.

While working for TEYF in Russia, CHS was present for meetings between TEYF and Russian government officials. CHS recalled meeting Belyaminov, Chairman of the Customs Committee and Uzhilim Vitaliy, a member of the Russian Duma or parliament as well as a member of the budget committee. TEYF met with Belyaminov to obtain customs benefits allowing TEYF to get goods easily through customs. The meeting with Vitaliy was because he and TEYF were friends and had some common business venture. During the last meeting CHS had with TEYF he was told TEYF doesn't communicate with Vitaliy any longer. CHS advised that TEYF used his connections with the Russian government to make money.

TEYF is married to Tatianna. CHS met her in Russia. TEYF has an ex-girlfriend (CHS does not recall name). CHS guessed that the reason TEYF had CTK in Chicago was to be able to travel to Chicago to see his girlfriend, as TEYF's home is in North Carolina. TEYF and the girlfriend have broken up. The girlfriend lives in Florida now. CHS may have airline tickets with the girlfriend's name on them. TEYF used Alfa bank in Russia. CHS would take money to the bank for TEYF or provide escorts. The manager at the bank knew TEYF. CHS saw documents indicating money was transferred to Cypress. CHS knew TEYF had stayed in Cypress at one time for approximately six months with his family. TEYF sold an oil refinery he had there. This was sometime before 2010. CHS did not travel with TEYF.

According to CHS, CTK started with 10 trucks but now has 20. There are 26 employees, 20 drivers and 6 other employees who hold various positions. CTK often purchases additional trucks from the Utah Company. CTK records are controlled by TIMOFEEV who also knows the most about the company. CTK has a road side as well as a railway side. The accounting office for CTK trucking is in the basement on the left. All CTK records are kept on computers in possession of TIMOFEEV. The offices for the railway side are on the first floor. Georgeiy B Gasgagze owns 50% of the rail side with TEYF owning the remaining 50%. TIMOFEEV has a Russian phone and a personal phone. TIMOFEEV uses the phones for CTK business. TIMOFEEV uses text messages as well as calls. It is unknown if any employees at CTK are illegal.

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CHS described TEYF as very cunning. When in Russia, CHS advised that he and TEYF might use a phone for only a day. CHS does not believe TEYF to have much of a credit history if any at all. CHS has not been involved with or seen luxury autos being exported. CHS identified Oarst VETRUK as a person at CTK who might be willing to provide information about TEYF and others. VETRUK worked as a Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) or Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) operative in the Ukraine for a time. VETRUK has a brother in a good position with the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in Moscow. TEYF wanted to get ZELENNOVA the accountant into the US but CHS believes her visa was denied. TEYF usually carries a briefcase with him. TEYF has a notepad wrapped in leather that he keeps all his contacts.

CHS has known TEYF in the past to burn documents when TEYF believes it to be necessary. CHS provided various documents which are attached and made a part hereto.

UNDEVELOPED LEADS

To be determined by HSI RAC Raleigh.

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